Introduction
It would be a truism to note the unequal aspects of international relations. States have various levels of economic power which determine their political influence: the latter marks their position on the international scene. The law, as for it, aims at polishing these differences by creating a legal equality between States. This is, for example, what is provided for by the United Nations Charter's preamble and by its articles 1(2), 2(1) and 55 1 on sovereign equality. The principle of equality has a reversed logic: it erases in theory the factual inequality which 1
See: The United Nations Charter, available on: http://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/ practically exists 2 . It is dressed with a psychological peel as it enables to tolerate and support the other types of inequality 3 . Equality between States means similar rights, similar duties and similar treatment 4 . States are equal legal subjects taken for granted that international law grants them with a similar level of protection while crediting them with the same duties 5 . For some authors this "forensic equality" must not even be proved: it is obvious 6 . Despite the inequality of States in terms of size, of population, of power or wealth, they remain equal international legal entities 7 . This being said, there is often a direct relationship between States' power and the process of creation of international law -and of its enforcement afterwards 8 . Consequently, and as asserted by Kelsen, this legal equality is merely theoretical. It constitutes the expression of the principle of a legal theory and not -intrinsically -, of the substance of law. And, it is the latter which is normally most relevant to interpret the principle of States' equality. Equality of States is construed as implying equality of their rights, and it cannot be supported that States always have the same rights and the same obligations: this would obviously be contrary to the legal reality 9 .
Still, under this configuration, modern international agreements are not tantamount to unequal treaties. Unequal treaties are those which are imposed upon States by other States using military, political or economical force, and which are not grounded on the 2 SCHINDLER Dietrich. Contribution à l'étude des facteurs sociologiques et psychologiques du droit international. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 46, p. 261. 3 Ibid., p.263.
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SCOTT, James Brown. Le principe de l'égalité juridique dans les rapports internationaux. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 42, p. 477. 5 PREUSS, Ulrich K. Equality of States-Its Meaning in a Constitutionalized Global Order. Chicago Journal of International Law, v. 9, p. 18, 2008 Law, v. 9, p. 18, -2009 ; VAN Review, v. 37, n. 6, p. 801-802, oct. 1951 6 MCNAIR, Arnold D. Equality in International Law. Michigan Law Review, v. 36, n. 2, p. 136, déc. 1927. 7 OPPENHEIM, Lassa. International Law: a treaties. 3. ed. Londres: Ronald F. Roxburg, 2008. p. 196. 8 SCHINDLER, Dietrich. op. cit., p.262.; VAN, Wynen Thomas Ann, THOMAS JUNIOR, A. J. op. cit., p. 802. 9 KELSEN, Hans. Théorie générale du droit international public: problèmes choisis. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 42, p. 190, 1932 ; see also: GILBERT, Guillaume. Droits et devoirs des nations: la théorie classique des droits fondamentaux des Etats. R.C.A.D.I., ano 5, v. 10, p. 593-597, 1925 ; VERDROSS, Alfred. Règles générales du droit international de la paix. R.C.A.D.I., ano 5, v. 30, p. 415, 1929 ; SCHINDLER, Dietrich. op. cit., p. 262.
principle of reciprocity; the rights and duties of the parties are, therein, not reciprocal 10 . The old, longburied theory of unequal treaties is here mentioned and excavated for the purpose of analysing one specific conundrum -at least, sometimes considered as such by some -, of international investment law: the socalled imbalanced nature of bilateral investment treaties. Bilateral treaties are signed between States to offer reciprocal protection to their investors. Some Statesespecially Latin American ones 11 -have been criticising the general system of international investment law and their flanked bilateral investment agreements for being flawed with an inherent disequilibrium. The system is often considered as imbalanced in favour of foreign investors. Bilateral investment treaties which are signed between States to protect and to promote international investments provide an arsenal of rights to foreign investors without providing for equivalent obligations. An investor can claim rights by invoking the provisions of an investment agreement but he cannot be held liable for any obligation under the same treaty. Conversely, States have an obligation to protect foreign investors as per the investment-related agreements they have ratified, but they cannot expect any reciprocal obligation from them. In a nutshell therefore, investors have mostly rights and no obligations towards States which have, on their side, mostly obligations but no equivalent rights in their relation with investors. For part of the doctrine, international investment law is a monster of power aiming only at the protection of investors and their investments, ignoring in this process the other interests implied by presence of other actors 12 . Politically, the President of Ecuador, Raphael Correa has, for example, explained the necessity of nature. If this has an effect on the creation of law, it does not necessarily means that the law produced is in itself imbalanced. And even if it were, the problem might not be purely legal; it might simply be a moral appreciation without any serious effects on the legal structure. Through the lenses of the theory of unequal treaties which must here be excavated and developed for being an old, nearly fossilised concept (I), it can be affirmed and confirmed that the latter does not apply to investment agreements -despite the latter's appearance (II).
Excavating The Theory of Unequal Treaties
Studying this theory starts by an analysis of the legal status of unequal treaties (A) before understanding the reasons grounding their former existence (B).
(A) The Legal Status of Unequal Treaties
The inequality characterising an unequal treaty rests on the imbalanced promises which it contains whereby one party is made inferior to the other 26 . Journal, v. 7, p. 544-548, 1984 ; KU, Charlotte. Abolition of China's unequal treaties and the search for regional stability in Asia, 1919 -1943 . Chinese/Taiwan Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, v. 12, p. 67-86, 1992 (a) Full and entire juridical equality ought to be limited to those States among which there have been developed the fundamental juridical ideas essential to the co-existence of States in society.
(b) A State which does not find itself in a position to fulfil its international duties towards other States, either as a result of traditional prejudices, of its internal organization, or its customs and its religious beliefs, can only demand the full enjoyment of international rights in perfect equality on condition that it change its internal organization so as to enable it to fulfil its international duties by giving substantial guarantees on this subject... The theory of unequal treaties has not always been recognised by the majority of the doctrine in international law, especially the European one 39 . Contextually, this is normal. The European States were the 'superior' and dominant parties to these agreements and the European doctrine of this epoch and even of more recent times considered this legal configuration as something obeying to the utmost normality. And utmost normality is never questioned. Logically, in the opposite sense, the doctrinal approach of States suffering from these treaties was different and they were qualified as unequal From the stance of those who bore these agreements, domination and humiliation were the leitmotifs. There are various other reasons explaining unequal treaties.
(B) The reasons behind unequal treaties.
Two main series of reasons ground the logic of unequal treaties. The first one has a civilisational character, the second, an economical one. Firstly, the civilisational reason is related to the difference in the legal culture and in the general culture of States. In this sense, the Chinese law was not of immediate access and understanding to Europeans because of the language barrier and also because the principles, rules and customs differed utterly 50 . In Imperial China, law had a relative value and there was a reign of a Confucian conception of the social structure whereby non-legal rules of behaviour which the citizens imposed to themselves to regulate their social life were more important and were therefore given priority over the sovereign rules. The legal culture as it existed in Europe at that time was inexistent in China
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. The principle of the separation of powers, dear to many European States, did not have roots in China 52 . In another region, the Ottoman Empire had also signed capitulation treaties with Western European States or with the United States. The inequality here was not, as a matter of fact, related to the element of power, the Empire being itself a dominant one under the rule of the sultans. The Empire's territory was under the jurisdiction of islamic law which did not apply to nonmuslims. As a result, treaties passed with the sultans enabled non-muslim foreigners to remain under the jurisdiction of their State of nationality on the Empire's territory; here, there was not a real subordination 53 . These were some factors which justified, initially, the will to establish such conventional relationship qualified as unequal. However, and this is the second reason, a mercantile objective also lurked behind these treaties. The United States, for example, wanted to maintain its extraterritorial rights on the Moroccan soil at any cost even when the latter State fell under the French protectorate regime, and therefore under French law 54 . The same trade-oriented will applied in the Chinese case. The interests of the independent States of that era in building and maintaining a relationship with China were, of course, commercial ones. The aim of the treaties they imposed was to open the Chinese market and to exploit the Chinese production. It is this political and economical conjunction which lead China -unfavourable to any foreign presence on its territory -, to the two Opium wars in 1839 and 1857 respectively. These wars resulted in the above- characterising an agreement does not give rise to any practical problem. The latter can be of a political character but it obeys to a legal concretisation in the case of a treaty denunciation, for example, -and it is not useless to pay attention to the reasons underscoring treaty denunciation. The denunciation of bilateral investment treaties by Venezuela or by Ecuador and the will of some States, often developing ones, to end the investment-related agreements by which they are linked is justified by the disequilibrium inherent to their conventional relationship with industrialised States 65 . If these agreements are legally founded and valid, they have become unacceptable for some. The aim here is not to affirm that bilateral investment treaties are by definition always unequal and that this is condemnable or must be condemned, but to understand what legal consequences are attached to an eventual disequilibrium.
II. Upholding the Relativity of Bilateral Investment Treaties as Unequal Treaties
Understanding the overall equilibrium of bilateral investment treaties (A) enables to affirm that they do not pertain to the category of unequal treaties when studied through the lenses of the unequal treaties theory (B).
A) Understanding The Overall Equilibrium of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Firstly, the procedural equilibrium of the bilateral treaties has to be examined (i); secondly, the study has to focus on the material provisions of these treaties in order to see if they unreasonably favour one party more than the other and if, in so doing, the latter finds itself in a position of subordination, forcefully at the mercy of his economic partner (ii). to submit a claim against American companies. The tribunal rejected the claim and explained that if Iran could submit a counterclaim against American citizens -which supposed that the latter had already started legal proceedings -, no interpretation could imply that the parties had initially provided for the triggering of the procedure by a State against a national 71 . Hence, in the relationship between private person and State, the initiative of action rested in the former's hands. This award was rendered with three dissenting opinions. The dissenting arbitrators underlined the absence of consideration of the reciprocity principle by the tribunal. They affirmed that the Algiers Declarations were built on this principle which is the ratio of mutual obligations between the States 72 . In their opinion, the Declarations must not be interpreted in a way to benefit only one of the parties so that the other's claims be forever classified as procedurally inadmissible because if this was the case, the Declarations would lose their equilibrium and would be wither without a cause or with a superficial cause. The reasons on which they rest to support this position is contextual; the context is such that there is a higher probability that it is an American company which starts proceedings against Iran than an Iranian company against the UnitedStates. The tribunal, say the dissenting arbitrators, has not considered this context and this deprives the provision providing for Iranian claims against the United-States of any effectivity and leaves it with a mere poetical effect, they add 73 . In this situation where only American companies have the upper hand, these arbitrators do not understand why Iran has to bear half of the tribunal's expenses. As for counterclaims, they argue that these are means of defence which can be used against a claimant for an action which has already started and that in any case, producing a counterclaim 71 Case related to the tribunal's competence following Iranian claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 1981 (signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims Tribunal, International Legal Materials, v. 21, p. 81-82, 1982. 72 Case related to the tribunal's competence following Iranian claims against American citizens, award, 21 December 1981 (signed on the 13th January 1982), Iran-US Claims Tribunal, International Legal Materials, v. 21, p. 85, 1982. is a right which is made available to any defendant 74 . Conceptually, the point on which they dissented was the absence of equilibrium between the parties which is prone to kill the reciprocity of any agreement. It is exactly on this background that investor-State arbitration is held in international investment law. Investors and States have pre-defined and preestablished roles.
According to an author, this is normal as the private investor is himself in an unequal position, taken as a hostage, he claims, by the double function of the State which is on one hand, a contracting party and on the other, the public person with regulatory powers, with prérogatives de puissance publique 75 . There is perhaps an exaggerated reference to a hostage-like situation, especially when many multinational companies are sometimes more powerful than their State partners 76 . The author however adopts an interesting analogical approach. He compares the logic of international investment arbitration to administrative law or to other international legal procedure, like the one applicable before the European Court of Human Rights, whereby only the person having suffered a damage has the capacity to start a proceeding against a State which has promised to abide to certain obligations; any asymmetry is consequently implicit but at the same time, quite normal 77 -and surely accepted. If it is an arbitration to assess the responsibility of the host State of an investor, the procedure is very close to a control of legality found in administrative law, especially the French one, and in this case, it is obvious that only one party can start the arbitration machinery 78 . administrative law is that in investment arbitration, the claimant is always a foreign company. What is surely somehow disturbing for some and what eventually takes the form or the appearance of a disequilibrium is the image of the multinational company which ferociously distrusts the national tribunals of the host State and which prefers the jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunals. This situation of a dominant foreigner with such power against a State, especially when the latter is a developing one, gives birth to the mental image of the colonial usurper having a violent force of domination and enslavement on State's sovereignty. Finally, it may be that the disequilibrium is only a question of image or of images' association. Indeed, it is less disturbing and less questionable when a private person or company sues the State of which he is a national before an administrative tribunal of the municipal legal order. The same can be said as far as the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are concerned. For these reasons, assimilating bilateral investment treaties with unequal treaties can be tricky considering, moreover, that these treaties are not imposed by violence and are done in crystal-clear legality, in conformity with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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. It is mostly the extraneous character of the private foreign investor which gives rise to the question of inequality which must now be assessed following the substantial provisions of bilateral investment treaties.
(ii) The Question of the Substantial Inequality of Bilateral Investment Treaties These treaties are often criticised because of the numerous and important rights they confer to investors without providing for equivalent obligations 80 . Reading any bilateral investment treaty confirms the large extent of protection granted to investors, sometimes even overprotected by the application of the mostfavoured nation clause. It is very rare to see bilateral investment treaties containing any substantial provision on development objectives or other State interest for example. As aforementioned, this is due to an inequality in the bargaining and negotiating power of States
81
. This being said, the situation is a formalisation of a legal bilateralism as it is possible to clearly identify who has rights and obligations and by whom these can be enforced 82 . However, the effectivity of norms in bilateral agreements is guaranteed by the principle of reciprocity 83 , and it is in this sense that bilateral investment treaties are sometimes considered as practically unilateral. The relationship between private persons and States makes sense only if these actors accept and recognise each other mutually and if, at the same time, they acknowledge their respective interests. This is what must be understood by reciprocity which, as put by Professor Virally, is the soul of treaties 84 ; outside this framework, the relationship is that of a master and a slave or that of a permanent state of war, he argues 85 . Bilateral treaties are not unilateral acts providing privileges to foreign traders against any form of violence as it was the case in Europe between the VIIIe and the XIIIe century 86 . This unilateral aspect of investment treaties must, nonetheless, be processed through relativity.
The legal reciprocity of a bilateral investment treaty in fact means that the investors from both signatory States can invoke the treaties' provisions against a reprehensible behaviour of the host State. On the basis of a bilateral investment treaty between the United Kingdom and Russia, a British investor can sue the Russian State if the latter infringes the treaty's provisions and similarly, a Russian investor vexed by the United Kingdom can ask for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to seek damages. Both investors are protected in a similar fashion. Legally, the principle of reciprocity is not frustrated; it concerns the reciprocal actions of private investors from the States parties to the treaty rather than the States' actions themselves. Again, some bitter relativity must be brought here, and this is related to the status of the States having signed the agreement. In his Hague lecture, Professor 81 VIRALLY, Michel. Le principe de réciprocité dans le droit international contemporain. R.C.A.D.I., ano 3, v. 122, p. 66, 1967. 82 SIMMA, Bruno. From Bilateral to Community Interest in International Law. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 250, p. 232-233, 1994. Virally raised the question of the possibility of any reciprocity when one of the partners was a developing State
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. The legal equality is not a factual equality. To continue with the same example, the United Kingdom is also a party to bilateral investment treaties signed with States like Haiti, Nepal, Burundi or Cameroon. The question here is of a practical and logical order. There are certainly more British investors in Nepal or Cameroon than Nepalese or Cameroonese investors in the United Kingdom. Thus, it is more probable that the treaty be really useful only to British investors. The economic disparity between the States frames the treaty to the only benefit and use of the investor from developed States as he only has sufficient means to undertake international investments. What has been said is far from being subversive and demagogical but is a mere description of reality. Despite the rise of the so-called BRICS, there are, for the time being, more investments circulation from developed States towards developing ones 88 . On these grounds, the bilateralism can be doubtful. Reciprocity exists in law and this cannot be denied. It however sometimes remains in its theoretical aspect and loses itself behind a factual inequality. But, in any case, any disequilibrium which might characterise investment treaties is, in reality, an accepted disequilibrium.
B) Affirming The Voluntary Disequilibrium Of Bilateral Investment Treaty.
From the precedent analysis, it is possible to conclude that bilateral investment treaties are theoretically equal but that some relativity must sometimes be injected, especially when it comes to the interaction between developing and developed States. Nevertheless, these agreements are not forcefully imposed on States as it was in the case of Imperial China. There is an obvious difference in the economic level and negotiation capacity of the States but bilateral investment treaties are always signed voluntarily 89 ; even those States which denounce such treaties later on had initially consented as per the requirements of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is true that some States did not master the appropriate technical tools of international investment law and have signed such agreements without an iota 87 VIRALLY, op. cit., p. 88-89.
88 JUILLARD, Patrick. L'évolution des sources du droit des investissements. R.C.A.D.I., ano 4, v. 250, p. 107, 1994. 89 BEN, op. cit., p. 201.
of knowledge of the future consequences. As Professor Juillard ironically stated, very often, the treaty models of developed States were just sent to the relevant ministry of developing States and a few days later, the treaties were sent back with the competent authority's signature 90 . Other States engage in such agreements even if they are aware that their citizens will probably not invest abroad simply because they expect to derive some benefits in terms of an increase in the level of foreign investments or in terms of a consolidation of the political relationship with the other partner 91 . It is a sort of compromise of interests which do not, as such, pertain to the field of law. The United Nations Charter, for historical reasons, provides for the existence of five permanent members with a right of veto 92 . If this is a form of inequality between States, many States accept it despite the gradual evaporation of the historical reasons. The question is not whether there is or not a voluntary servitude from some States; legally speaking, the signature and the ratification means consent and therefore, the State has to abide to its conventional engagement in good faith 93 whether it is based on an equal or an unequal foundation, and whether it is or not reciprocal. The consequences have to be measured before the signature. The latter, once sealed, is submitted to pacta sund servanda 94 . If some States are no longer satisfied with such agreements, they have the possibility of denouncing them 95 or of refusing their extension. This is an attribute of their sovereignty. They cannot be engaged without their will 96 , but once the consent has been given, it remains legally valid and binding. 
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